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Abstract
Neural networks are increasingly deployed in real-world safety-critical domains
such as autonomous driving, aircraft collision avoidance, and malware detection.
However, these networks have been shown to often mispredict on inputs with minor
adversarial or even accidental perturbations. Consequences of such errors can be
disastrous and even potentially fatal as shown by the recent Tesla autopilot crashes.
Thus, there is an urgent need for formal analysis systems that can rigorously check
neural networks for violations of different safety properties such as robustness
against adversarial perturbations within a certain L-norm of a given image. An
effective safety analysis system for a neural network must be able to either ensure
that a safety property is satisfied by the network or find a counterexample, i.e.,
an input for which the network will violate the property. Unfortunately, most
existing techniques for performing such analysis struggle to scale beyond very
small networks and the ones that can scale to larger networks suffer from high
false positives and cannot produce concrete counterexamples in case of a property
violation. In this paper, we present a new efficient approach for rigorously checking
different safety properties of neural networks that significantly outperforms existing
approaches by multiple orders of magnitude. Our approach can check different
safety properties and find concrete counterexamples for networks that are 10×
larger than the ones supported by existing analysis techniques. We believe that our
approach to estimating tight output bounds of a network for a given input range
can also help improve the explainability of neural networks and guide the training
process of more robust neural networks.
1 Introduction
Over the last few years, significant advances in neural networks have resulted in their increasing
deployments in critical domains including healthcare, autonomous vehicles, and security. However,
recent work has shown that neural networks, despite their tremendous success, often make dangerous
mistakes, especially for rare corner case inputs. For example, most state-of-the-art neural networks
have been shown to produce incorrect outputs for adversarial inputs specifically crafted by adding
minor human-imperceptible perturbations to regular inputs [36, 14]. Similarly, seemingly minor
changes in lighting or orientation of an input image have been shown to cause drastic mispredictions
by the state-of-the-art neural networks [29, 30, 37]. Such mistakes can have disastrous and even
potentially fatal consequences. For example, a Tesla car in autopilot mode recently caused a fatal
crash as it failed to detect a white truck against a bright sky with white clouds [3].
A principled way of minimizing such mistakes is to ensure that neural networks satisfy simple
safety/security properties such as the absence of adversarial inputs within a certain L-norm of a given
image or the invariance of the network’s predictions on the images of the same object under different
lighting conditions. Ideally, given a neural network and a safety property, an automated checker
should either guarantee that the property is satisfied by the network or find concrete counterexamples
demonstrating violations of the safety property. The effectiveness of such automated checkers hinges
on how accurately they can estimate the decision boundary of the network.
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However, strict estimation of the decision boundary of a neural network with piecewise linear
activation functions such as ReLU is a hard problem. While the linear pieces of each ReLU node can
be partitioned into two linear constraints and efficiently check separately, the total number of linear
pieces grow exponentially with the number of nodes in the network [25, 27]. Therefore, exhaustive
enumeration of all combinations of these pieces for any modern network is prohibitively expensive.
Similarly, sampling-based inference techniques like blackbox Monte Carlo sampling may need an
enormous amount of data to generate tight accurate bounds on the decision boundary [11].
In this paper, we propose a new efficient approach for rigorously checking different safety properties
of neural networks that significantly outperform existing approaches by multiple orders of magnitude.
Specifically, we introduce two key techniques. First, we use symbolic linear relaxation that combines
symbolic interval analysis and linear relaxation to compute tighter bounds on the network outputs
by keeping track of relaxed dependencies across inputs during interval propagation when the actual
dependencies become too complex to track. Second, we introduce a novel technique called directed
constraint refinement to iteratively minimize the errors introduced during the relaxation process
until either a safety property is satisfied or a counterexample is found. To make the refinement
process efficient, we identify the potentially overestimated nodes, i.e., the nodes where inaccuracies
introduced during relaxation can potentially affect the checking of a given safety property, and use
off-the-shelf solvers to focus only on those nodes to further tighten their output ranges.
We implement our techniques as part of Neurify, a system for rigorously checking a diverse set
of safety properties of neural networks 10× larger than the ones that can be handled by existing
techniques. We used Neurify to check six different types of safety properties of nine different
networks trained on five different datasets. Our experimental results show that on average Neurify is
5, 000× faster than Reluplex [17] and 20× than ReluVal [39].
Besides formal analysis of safety properties, we believe our method for efficiently estimating tight
and rigorous output ranges of a network will also be useful for guiding the training process of robust
networks [42, 32] and improving explainability of the decisions made by neural networks [34, 20, 23].
Related work. Several researchers have tried to extend and customize Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solvers for estimating decision boundaries with strong guarantees [17, 18, 15, 10, 31]. Another
line of research has used Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) solvers for such analysis [38,
12, 7]. Unfortunately, the efficiency of both of these approaches is severely limited by the high
nonlinearity of the resulting formulas.
Different convex or linear relaxation techniques have also been used to strictly approximate the
decision boundary of neural networks. While these techniques tend to scale significantly better than
solver-based approaches, they suffer from high false positive rates and struggle to find concrete
counterexamples demonstrating violations of safety properties [42, 32, 13, 9]. Similarly, existing
works on finding lower bounds of adversarial perturbations to fool a neural network also suffer
from the same limitations [28, 41]. Note that concurrent work of Weng et al. [40] uses similar
linear relaxation method as ours but it alone struggles to solve such problems as shown in Table
6. Also, their follow-up work [44] that provides a generic relaxation method for general activation
functions does not address this issue either. In contrast, we mainly use our relaxation technique to
identify crucial nodes and iteratively refine output approximations over these nodes with the help of
linear solver. Another line of research has focused on strengthening network robustness either by
incorporating these relaxation methods into training process [43, 8, 24] or by leveraging techniques
like differential privacy [22]. Our method, essentially providing a more accurate formal analysis of a
network, can potentially be incorporated into training process to further improve network robustness.
Recently, ReluVal, by Wang et al. [39], has used interval arithmetic [33] for rigorously estimating
a neural network’s decision boundary by computing tight bounds on the outputs of a network for
a given input range. While ReluVal achieved significant performance gain over the state-of-the-art
solver-based methods [17] on networks with a small number of inputs, it struggled to scale to larger
networks (see detailed discussions in Section 2).
2 Background
We build upon two prior works [10, 39] on using interval analysis and linear relaxations for analyzing
neural networks. We briefly describe them and refer interested readers to [10, 39] for more details.
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Symbolic interval analysis. Interval arithmetic [33] is a flexible and efficient way of rigorously
estimating the output ranges of a function given an input range by computing and propagating the
output intervals for each operation in the function. However, naive interval analysis suffers from
large overestimation errors as it ignores the input dependencies during interval propagation. To
minimize such errors, Wang et al. [39] used symbolic intervals to keep track of dependencies by
maintaining linear equations for upper and lower bounds for each ReLU and concretizing only for
those ReLUs that demonstrate non-linear behavior for the given input intervals. Specifically, consider
an intermediate ReLU node z = Relu(Eq), (l, u) = (Eq,Eq), where Eq denotes the symbolic
representation (i.e., a closed-form equation) of the ReLU’s input in terms of network inputs X and
(l, u) denote the concrete lower and upper bounds of Eq, respectively. There are three possible output
intervals that the ReLU node can produce depending on the bounds of Eq: (1) z = [Eq,Eq] when
l ≥ 0, (2) z = [0, 0] when u ≤ 0, or (3) z = [l, u] when l < 0 < u. Wang et al. will concretize the
output intervals for this node only if the third case is feasible as the output in this case cannot be
represented using a single linear equation.
Bisection of input features. To further minimize overestimation, [39] also proposed an iterative
refinement strategy involving repeated input bisection and output reunion. Consider a network
F taking d-dimensional input, and the i-th input feature interval is Xi and network output in-
terval is F (X) where X = {X1, ..., Xd}. A single bisection on Xi will create two children:
X ′ = {X1, ..., [Xi, Xi+Xi2 ], ..., Xd} and X ′′ = {X1, ..., [
Xi+Xi
2 , Xi], ..., Xd}. The reunion of the
corresponding output intervals F (X ′)
⋃
F (X ′′), will be tighter than the original output interval, i.e.,
F (X ′)
⋃
F (X ′′) ⊆ F (X), as the Lipschitz continuity of the network ensures that the overestimation
error decreases as the width of input interval becomes smaller. However, the efficiency of input
bisection decreases drastically as the number of input dimensions increases.
z′
z
l u
W3
W1
x3
x1
W2x2 z′ z
z ≥ 0
z ≥ z′
z ≤ (z′ − l)
u
u − l
Figure 1: Linear relaxation of a ReLU node.
Linear relaxation. Ehlers et al. [10] used lin-
ear relaxation of ReLU nodes to strictly over-
approximate the non-linear constraints intro-
duced by each ReLU. The generated linear con-
straints can then be efficiently solved using a
linear solver to get bounds on the output of a
neural network for a given input range. Consider
the simple ReLU node taking input z′ with an
upper and lower bound u and l respectively and
producing output z as shown in Figure 1. Linear relaxation of such a node will use the following
three linear constraints: (1) z ≥ 0, (2) z ≥ z′, and (3) z ≤ u(z′−l)u−l to expand the feasible region to the
green triangle from the two original piecewise linear components. The effectiveness of this approach
heavily depends on how accurately u and l can be estimated. Unfortunately, Ehlers et al. [10] used
naive interval propagation to estimate u and l leading to large overestimation errors. Furthermore,
their approach cannot efficiently refine the estimated bounds and thus cannot benefit from increasing
computing power.
3 Approach
In this paper, we make two major contributions to scale formal safety analysis to networks significantly
larger than those evaluated in prior works [17, 10, 42, 39]. First, we combine symbolic interval
analysis and linear relaxation (described in Section 2) in a novel way to create a significantly
more efficient propagation method–symbolic linear relaxation–that can achieve substantially tighter
estimations (evaluated in Section 4). Second, we present a technique for identifying the overestimated
intermediate nodes, i.e., the nodes whose outputs are overestimated, during symbolic linear relaxation
and propose directed constraint refinement to iteratively refine the output ranges of these nodes. In
Section 4, we also show that this method mitigates the limitations of input bisection [39] and scales
to larger networks.
Figure 2 illustrates the high-level workflow of Neurify. Neurify takes in a range of inputs X and
then determines using linear solver whether the output estimation generated by symbolic linear
relaxation satisfies the safety proprieties. A property is proven to be safe if the solver find the
relaxed constraints unsatisfiable. Otherwise, the solver returns potential counterexamples. Note that
the returned counterexamples found by the solver might be false positives due to the inaccuracies
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introduced by the relaxation process. Thus Neurify will check whether a counterexample is a false
positive. If so, Neurify will use directed constraint refinement guided by symbolic linear relaxation
to obtain a tighter output bound and recheck the property with the solver.
3.1 Symbolic Linear Relaxation
Symbolic linear 
relaxation
Refine 
overest. node
Constraints
Concrete
sample
Violated
Unsat
Linear solver
Check for 
violation
Input intervals
Timeout Unsafe
Safe
False positive
Split
target
node
Safety
propertyDNN
Figure 2: Workflow of Neurify to formally
analyze safety properties of neural networks.
The symbolic linear relaxation of the output of each
ReLU z = Relu(z′) leverages the bounds on z′,
Eqlow and Equp (Eqlow ≤ Eq∗(x) ≤ Equp). Here
Eq∗ denotes the closed-form representation of z′.
Specifically, Equation 1 shows the symbolic linear
relaxation where 7→ denotes “relax to”. In addition,
[llow, ulow] and [lup, uup] denote the concrete lower
and upper bounds for Eqlow and Equp, respectively.
In supplementary material Section 1.2, we give a de-
tailed proof showing that this relaxation is the tightest
achievable due to its least maximum distance from
Eq∗. In the following discussion, we simplify Eqlow
and Equp as Eq and the corresponding lower and
upper bounds as [l, u]. Figure 3 shows the differ-
ence between our symbolic relaxation process and
the naive concretizations used by Wang et al. [39].
More detailed discussions can be found in supple-
mentary material Section 2.
Relu(Eqlow) 7→ ulow
ulow − llow (Eqlow) Relu(Equp) 7→
uup
uup − lup (Equp − lup) (1)
z 
z′
u
(a) Naive concretizaion
z 
z′  0l 
z ≤ u 
z ≥ 0 
l u 0
z ≥
u
u ­ l
Eq 
z ≤
u
u ­ l
(Eq ­ l) 
(b) Symbolic linear relaxation
Figure 3: An illustration of symbolic linear relaxation for
an intermediate node. (a) Original symbolic interval anal-
ysis [39] used naive concretization. (b) Symbolic linear
relaxation leverages the knowledge of concrete bounds for z′
and computes relaxed symbolic interval. Eq is the symbolic
representation of z′.
In practice, symbolic linear relaxation
can cut (on average) 59.64% more
overestimation error than symbolic in-
terval analysis (cf. Section 2) and
saves the time needed to prove a prop-
erty by several orders of magnitude
(cf. Section 4). There are three key
reasons behind such significant per-
formance improvement. First, the
maximum possible error after intro-
ducing relaxations is −lup∗uupuup−lup for up-
per bound and −llow∗ulowulow−llow for lower
bound in Figure 3(b) (the proof is in
supplementary material Section 1.2).
These relaxations are considerably
tighter than naive concretizations shown in Figure 3(a), which introduces a larger error uup. Second,
symbolic linear relaxation, unlike naive concretization, partially keeps the input dependencies during
interval propagation ([ uu−lEq,
u
u−l (Eq − l)] by maintaining symbolic equations. Third, as the final
output error is exponential to the error introduced at each node (proved in supplementary 1.2), tighter
bounds on earlier nodes produced by symbolic relaxation significantly reduce the final output error.
3.2 Directed Constraint Refinement
Besides symbolic linear relaxation, we also develop another generic approach, directed constraint
refinement, to further improve the overall performance of property checking. Our empirical results
in Section 4 shows the substantial improvement from using this approach combined with symbolic
linear relaxation. In the following, we first define overestimated nodes before describing the directed
constraint refinement process in detail.
Overestimated nodes. We note that, for most networks, only a small proportion of intermediate
ReLU nodes operate in the non-linear region for a given input range X . These are the only nodes that
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need to be relaxed (cf. Section 2). We call these nodes overestimated as they introduce overestimation
error during relaxation. We include other useful properties and proofs regarding overestimated nodes
in supplementary material Section 1.1.
Based on the definition of overestimated nodes, we define one step of directed constraint refinement
as computing the refined output range F ′(X):
F ′(X) = F (x ∈ X|Eq(x) ≤ 0) ∪ F (x ∈ X|Eq(x) > 0) (2)
where X denotes the input intervals to the network, F is the corresponding network, and Eq is the
input equation of an overestimated node. Note that here we are showing the input of a node as a
single equation for simplicity instead of the upper and lower bounds shown in Section 3.1.
We iteratively refine the bounds by invoking a linear solver, allowing us to make Neurify more
scalable for difficult safety properties. The convergence analysis is given in supplementary material
Section 1.3.
The refinement includes the following three steps:
Locating overestimated nodes. From symbolic linear relaxations, we can get the set of overestimated
nodes within the network. We then prioritize the overestimated nodes with larger output gradient
and refine these influential overestimated nodes first. We borrow the idea from [39] of computing
the gradient of network output with respect to the input interval of the overestimated node. A larger
gradient value of a node signifies that the input of that node has a greater influence towards changing
the output than than the inputs of other nodes.
Splitting. After locating the target overestimated node, we split its input ranges into two independent
cases, Eqt > 0 and Eqt ≤ 0 where Eqt denotes the input of the target overestimated node. Now,
unlike symbolic linear relaxation where Relu([Eqt, Eqt]) 7→ [ uu−lEqt, uu−l (Eqt − l)], neither of
the two split cases requires any relaxation (Section 2) as the input interval no longer includes 0.
Therefore, splitting creates two tighter approximations of the output F (x ∈ X|Eqt(x) > 0) and
F (x ∈ X|Eqt(x) ≤ 0).
Solving. We solve the resulting linear constraints, along with the constraints defined in safety
properties, by instantiating an underlying linear solver. In particular, we define safety properties that
check that the confidence value of a target output class F t is always greater than the outputs of other
classes F o (e.g., outputs other than 7 for an image of a hand-written 7). We thus define the constraints
for safety properties as Eqtlow − Eqoup < 0. Here, Eqtlow and Eqoup are the lower bound equations
for F t and the upper bound equations for F o derived using symbolic linear relaxation. Each step
of directed constraint refinement of an overestimated node results in two independent problems as
shown in Equation 3 that can be checked with a linear solver.
Check Satifiability: Eqtlow1 − Eqoup1 < 0; Eqt ≤ 0; xi −  ≤ xi ≤ xi +  (i = 1 . . . d)
Check Satifiability: Eqtlow2 − Eqoup2 < 0; Eqt > 0; xi −  ≤ xi ≤ xi +  (i = 1 . . . d)
(3)
In this process, we invoke the solver in two ways. (1) If the solver tells that both cases are unsatisfiable,
then the property is formally proved to be safe. Otherwise, further iterative refinement steps can be
applied. (2) If either case is satisfiable, we treat the solutions returned by the linear solver as potential
counterexamples violating the safety properties. Note that these solutions might be false positives
due to the inaccuracies introduced during the relaxation process. We thus resort to directly executing
the target network with the solutions returned from the solver as input. If the solution does not violate
the property, we repeat the above process for another overestimated node (cf. Figure 2).
3.3 Safety Properties
In this work, we support checking diverse safety properties of networks including five different
classes of properties based on the input constraints. Particularly, we specify the safety properties of
neural network based on defining constraints on its input-output. For example, as briefly mentioned
in Section 3.1, we specify that the output of the network on input x should not change (i.e., remain
invariant) when x is allowed to vary within a certain range X . For output constraints, taking an
arbitrary classifier as an example, we define the output invariance by specifying the difference
greater than 0 between lower and upper bound of confidence value of the original class of the input
and other classes. For specifying input constraints, we consider three popular bounds, i.e., L∞,
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L1, and L2, which are widely used in the literature of adversarial machine learning [14]. These
three bounds allow for arbitrary perturbations of the input features as long as the corresponding
norms of the overall perturbation are within a certain threshold. In addition to these arbitrary
perturbations, we consider two specific perturbations that change brightness and contrast of the
input images as discussed in [30]. Properties specified using L∞ naturally fit into our symbolic
linear relaxation process where each input features are bounded by an interval. For properties
specified in L1 ≤  or L2 ≤ , we need to add more constraints, i.e.,
∑d
i=1 |xi| ≤  for L1, or∑d
i=1 xi
2 ≤  for L2, which are no longer linear. We handle such cases by using solvers that support
quadratic constraints (see details in Section 4). The safety properties involving changes in brightness
and contrast can be efficiently checked by iteratively bisecting the input nodes simultaneously as
minx∈[x−,x+](F (x)) = min(minx∈[x,x+](F (x)),minx∈[x−,x](F (x))) where F represents the
computation performed by the target network .
4 Experiments
Implementation. We implement Neurify with about 26,000 lines of C code. We use the highly
optimized OpenBLAS1 library for matrix multiplications and lp_solve 5.52 for solving the linear
constraints generated during the directed constraint refinement process. We further use Gurobi 8.0.0
solver for L2-bounded safety properties. All our evaluations were performed on a Linux server
running Ubuntu 16.04 with 8 CPU cores and 256GB memory. Besides, Neurify uses optimization
like thread rebalancing for parallelization and outward rounding to avoid incorrect results due to
floating point imprecision. Details of such techniques can be found in Section 3 of the supplementary
material.
Table 1: Details of the evaluated networks and corresponding safety properties. The last three columns
summarize the number of safety properties that are satisfied, violated, and timed out, respectively as
found by Neurify with a timeout threshold of 1 hour.
Dataset Models # ofReLUs Architecture
Safety
Property Safe Violated Timeout
ACAS
Xu [16] ACAS Xu 300
<5, 50, 50, 50,
50, 50, 50, 5>#
C.P.∗
in [39] 141 37 0
MNIST [21]
MNIST_FC1 48 <784, 24, 24, 10># L∞ 267 233 0
MNIST_FC2 100 <784, 50, 50, 10># L∞ 271 194 35
MNIST_FC3 1024 <784, 512, 512, 10># L∞ 322 41 137
MNIST_CN 4804
<784, k:16*4*4 s:2,
k:32*4*4 s:2, 100, 10>+ L∞ 91 476 233
Drebin [5]
Drebin_FC1 100 <545334, 50, 50, 2># C.P.∗
in [29]
458 21 21
Drebin_FC2 210 <545334, 200, 10, 2># 437 22 41
Drebin_FC3 400 <545334, 200, 200, 2># 297 27 176
Car [2] DAVE 10276
<30000, k:24*5*5 s:5,
k:36*5*5 s:5, 100, 10>+
L∞,L1,
Brightness,
Contrast
80 82 58
* Custom properties.
# <x, y, ...> denotes hidden layers with x neurons in first layer, y neurons in second layer, etc.
+ k:c*w*h s:stride denotes the output channel (c), kernel width (w), height (h) and stride (stride).
4.1 Properties Checked by Neurify for Each Model
Summary. To evaluate the performance of Neurify, we test it on nine models trained over five
datasets for different tasks where each type of model includes multiple architectures. Specifically, we
evaluate on fully connected ACAS Xu models [16], three fully connected Drebin models [5], three
fully connected MNIST models [21], one convolutional MNIST model [42], and one convolutional
self-driving car model [2]. Table 1 summarizes the detailed structures of these models. We include
more detailed descriptions in supplementary material Section 4. All the networks closely follow
the publicly-known settings and are either pre-trained or trained offline to achieve comparable
performance to the real-world models on these datasets.
1https://www.openblas.net/
2http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/
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We also summarize the safety properties checked by Neurify in Table 1 with timeout threshold set to
3,600 seconds. Here we report the result of the self-driving care model (DAVE) to illustrate how we
define the safety properties and the numbers of safe and violated properties found by Neurify. We
report the other results in supplementary material Section 5.
Table 2: Different safety properties checked by Neurify out of 10 random images on Dave within
3600 seconds.
(a) ||X ′ −X||∞ ≤ 
 1 2 5 8 10
Safe(%) 50 10 0 0 0
Violated(%) 0 20 70 100 100
Timeout(%) 50 70 30 0 0
(b) ||X ′ −X||1 ≤ 
 100 200 300 500 700
Safe(%) 100 100 10 10 0
Violated(%) 0 0 40 50 60
Timeout(%) 0 0 50 40 40
(c) Brightness: X −  ≤ X ′ ≤ X + 
 10 70 80 90 100
Safe(%) 100 30 20 10 10
Violated(%) 0 30 50 60 70
Timeout(%) 0 40 30 30 20
(d) Contrast: X ≤ X ′ ≤ X or X ≤ X ′ ≤ X
 0.2 0.5 0.99 1.01 2.5
Safe(%) 0 10 100 100 0
Violated(%) 70 20 0 0 50
Timeout(%) 30 70 0 0 50
Dave. We show that Neurify is the first formal analysis tool that can systematically check different
safety properties for a large (over 10,000 ReLUs) convolutional self-driving car network, Dave [2, 6].
We use the dataset from Udacity self-driving car challenge containing 101,396 training and 5,614
testing samples [4]. Our model’s architecture is similar to the DAVE-2 self-driving car architecture
from NVIDIA [6, 2] and it achieves similar 1-MSE as models used in [29]. We formally analyze the
network with inputs bounded by L∞, L1, brightness, and contrast as described in Section 3.3. We
define the safe range of deviation of the output steering direction from the original steering angle to
be less than 30 degrees. The total number of cases Neurify can verify are shown in Table 2.
Table 3: Total cases that can be verified by Neurify on three Drebin models out of 100 random
malware apps. The timeout setting here is 3600 seconds.
Models Cases(%) 10 50 100 150 200
Drebin_FC1
Safe 0 1 3 5 12
Violated 100 98 97 86 77
Total 100 99 100 91 89
Drebin_FC2
Safe 0 4 4 6 8
Violated 100 96 90 81 70
Total 100 100 94 87 78
Drebin_FC3
Safe 0 4 4 4 15
Violated 100 89 74 23 11
Total 100 93 78 33 26
DREBIN. We also evaluate Neurify on three different Drebin models containing 545,334 input
features. The safety property we check is that simply adding app permissions without changing any
functionality will not cause the models to misclassify malware apps as benign. Here we show in
Table 3 that Neurify can formally verify safe and unsafe cases for most of the apps within 3,600
seconds.
4.2 Comparisons with Other Formal Checkers
ACAS Xu. Unmanned aircraft alert systems (ACAS Xu) [19] are networks advising steering decisions
for aircrafts, which is on schedule to be installed in over 30,000 passengers and cargo aircraft
worldwide [26] and US Navy’s fleets [1]. It is comparably small and only has five input features so
that ReluVal [39] can efficiently check different safety properties. However, its performance still
suffers from the over-approximation of output ranges due to the concretizations introduced during
symbolic interval analysis. Neurify leverages symbolic linear relaxation and achieves on average
20× better performance than ReluVal [39] and up to 5,000× better performance than Reluplex [17].
In Table 4, we summarize the time and speedup of Neurify compared to ReluVal and Reluplex for all
the properties tested in [17, 39].
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Table 4: Performance comparisons of Neurify, Reluplex, and ReluVal while checking different safety
properties of ACAS Xu. φ1 to φ10 are the properties tested in [17]. φ11 to φ15 are the additional
properties tested in [39].
Source Props Reluplex (sec) ReluVal (sec) Neurify (sec) Reluplex
Neurify
(×) ReluV al
Neurify
(×)
Security
Properties
from [17]
φ1 >443,560.73* 14,603.27 458.75 > 967× 31.83×
φ∗∗2 123,420.40 117,243.26 16491.83 >8× 7.11×
φ3 35,040.28 19,018.90 600.64 58.33× 31.66×
φ4 13,919.51 441.97 54.56 255× 8.10×
φ5 23,212.52 216.88 21.378 1086× 10.15×
φ6 220,330.82 46.59 1.48 148872× 31.48×
φ7 >86400.00* 9,240.29 563.55 >154× 16.40×
φ8 43,200.01 40.41 33.17 1302× 1.22×
φ9 116,441.97 15,639.52 921.06 126.42× 16.98×
φ10 23,683.07 10.94 1.16 20416.38× 9.43×
Additional
Security
Properties
φ11 4,394.91 27.89 0.62 7089× 44.98×
φ12 2,556.28 0.104 0.13 19664× 0.80×
φ13 >172,800.00* 148.21 38.11 >4534× 3.89×
φ14 >172,810.86* 288.98 22.87 >7556× 12.64×
φ15 31,328.26 876.8 91.71 342× 9.56×
* Reluplex uses different timeout thresholds for different properties.
** Reluplex returns spurious counterexamples on two safe networks due to a rounding bug and ends
prematurely.
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Figure 4: As we increase the L∞ bounds of the safety properties, the number of cases ReluVal and
Reluplex can verify quickly decreases while Neurify clearly outperforms both of them. We use 50
randomly selected imaged for each property and set the timeout to 1,200 seconds.
MNIST_FC. The MNIST networks have significantly more inputs than ACAS Xu. It has 784 input
features and ReluVal always times out when the analyzed input ranges become larger (L∞ ≥ 5). We
measure the performance of Neurify on fully connected MNIST models MNIST_FC1, MNIST_FC2
and MNIST_FC3 and compare the cases that can be verified to be safe or a counterexample can be
found by ReluVal and Reluplex in Figure 4. The results show that Neurify constantly outperforms the
other two. Especially when increasing the L∞ bound, the percentages of properties that the other two
can verify quickly decrease. Note that the increase in Figure 4b is caused by the more unsafe cases
detected by Neurify. Initially, when the bounds are small, Neurify can easily check the properties
to be safe. But as the bounds get larger, the number of verified safe cases drop drastically because
(i) the underlying model tends to have real violations and (ii) Neurify suffers from relatively higher
overestimation errors. However, as the bounds increase further, the counterexamples become frequent
enough to be easily found by Neurify. Therefore, such phenomenon indicates that Neurify can find
counterexamples more effectively than ReluVal and Reluplex due to its tighter approximation.
4.3 Benefits of Each Technique
Table 5: The average widths of output ranges
of three MNIST models for 100 random im-
ages where each has five different L∞ ≤
{1, 5, 10, 15, 25}.
NIA∗ SLR∗∗ Improve(%)
MNIST_FC1 111.87 52.22 114.23
MNIST_FC2 230.27 101.72 126.38
MNIST_FC3 1271.19 624.27 103.63
* Naive Interval Arithmetic
** Symbolic Linear Relaxation
Symbolic Linear Relaxation (SLR). We com-
pare the widths of estimated output ranges com-
puted by naive interval arithmetic [39] and
symbolic linear relaxation on MNIST_FC1,
MNIST_FC2, MNIST_FC3. We summarize the
average output widths in Table 5. The experi-
ments are based on 100 images each bounded
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Figure 5: Showing the cases out of 100 randomly selected images that can be verified by Neurify,
new ReluVal+SLR and original ReluVal. Here ReluVal+SLR denotes the new ReluVal improved
with our symbolic linear relaxation for showing the performance of DCR. The timeout setting is 600
seconds.
by L∞ ≤  ( = 1, ..., 25). The results indicate that SLR in Neurify can tighten the output intervals
by at least 100% over naive interval arithmetic, which significantly speeds up its performance.
Table 6: The timeout cases out of 100 random
images generated while using symbolic linear re-
laxation alone and together with directed con-
straint refinement. These results are computed for
MNIST_CN model with L∞ ≤  ( = 1, ..., 25).
The last column shows the number of additional
cases checked while using directed constraint re-
finement.
Properties SLR SLR + DCR Improve
 = 1 0 0 0
 = 2 2 1 1
 = 3 6 0 6
 = 4 18 5 13
 = 5 58 12 46
 = 10 100 90 10
 = 15 100 80 20
 = 25 100 45 55
Directed Constraint Refinement (DCR). To
illustrate how DCR can improve the overall per-
formance when combined with SLR, we eval-
uate Neurify on MNIST_CN and measure the
number of timeout cases out of 100 randomly se-
lected input images when using symbolic linear
relaxation alone and combining it with directed
constraint refinement. Table 6 shows that SLR
combined with DCR can verify 18.88% more
cases on average than those using SLR alone.
Improvements Evaluated on MNIST. We
evaluate how symbolic linear relaxation and
directed constraint refinement each can im-
prove the performance compared with Relu-
Val on three fully connected MNIST models,
MNIST_FC1, MNIST_FC2, and MNIST_FC3.
For measuring the improvement made by sym-
bolic linear relaxation, we integrate it into Relu-
Val denoted as ReluVal+SLR (input bisection + symbolic linear relaxation) and we compare with the
number of original ReluVal (input bisection + symbolic interval analysis). As for the performance
of directed constraint refinement, we make comparisons between ReluVal+SLR (input bisection +
symbolic linear relaxation) and Neurify (directed constraint refinement + symbolic linear relaxation).
We summarize the total cases that can be verified by Neurify, original ReluVal, and ReluVal+SLR out
of 100 random MNIST images within 600 seconds in Figure 5. The safety properties are defined as
whether the models will misclassify the images within allowable perturbed input ranges bounded
by L∞ ≤ ( = 1, ..., 10). The experimental results demonstrate that our symbolic linear approx-
imation can help ReluVal find 15% more cases on average. However, the input bisection used by
ReluVal+SLR still suffers from larger number of input features and thus usually times out when  is
large. Neurify’s DCR approach mitigated that problem and additionally verify up to 65% more cases
on average compared to ReluVal.
5 Conclusion
We designed and implemented Neurify, an efficient and scalable platform for verifying safety
properties of real-world neural networks and providing concrete counterexamples. We propose
symbolic linear relaxation to compute a tight over-approximation of a network’s output for a given
input range and use directed constraint refinement to further refine the bounds using linear solvers.
Our extensive empirical results demonstrate that Neurify outperforms state-of-the-art formal analysis
systems by several orders of magnitude and can easily scale to networks with more than 10,000 ReLU
nodes.
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A Proofs
A.1 Properties of Overestimated Nodes
Below we describe and prove some useful properties that overestimated nodes satisfy. Throughout this section,
X denotes an input interval range, z = Relu(Eq) denotes an overestimated node, and W denotes a set of
overestimated nodes. Furthermore, [l, u] and [Eqlow, Equp] represent the concrete and symbolic intervals for
each node before ReLU function, respectively. Lastly, we let Eq∗ be its ground-true equation.
property A.1. Given input range X , an overestimated node’s (z = Relu(Eq)) concrete upper and lower
bounds satisfy u = maxx∈XEq(x) > 0 and l = minx∈XEq(x) < 0.
proof: It suffices to show that ∃x1, x2 ∈ X such that Eq(x1) > 0 and Eq(x2) < 0. If Eq are strictly non-
negative onX , then, for any x1 ∈ X , we haveRelu(Eq(x1)) = Eq(x1) and we do not perform any relaxations.
Likewise, if Eq are strictly non-positive, then for any x2 ∈ X , we have Relu(Eq(x2)) = 0, so we also do not
need to apply any relaxations. But, we assumed that the node was overestimated, so that there must be ∃x1 ∈ X
such that Eq(x1) > 0, and ∃x2 ∈ X such that Eq(x2) < 0. Therefore, since u = maxx∈XEq(x) ≥ Eq(x1),
and l = minx∈XEq(x) ≤ Eq(x2), we have l < 0 and u > 0, which is the desired result.
property A.2. The symbolic input interval [Eqlow, Equp] to a node of the i-th layer satisfies Eqlow = Equp =
Eq∗ if there are no overestimated node in the earlier layers.
proof: We prove this inductively over the number of layers in a network. For the base case, we consider the
first layer, which is the input layer. The assumption that there is no overestimated node in all previous layers, in
this case, is always true, as we define overestimated nodes to occur only when we apply the activation function
ReLU. Thus, we have Eqlow = Eq∗ = Equp in this case. Now, suppose that the property holds for inputs
up to the i-th layer. We show it consequently holds for inputs to the (i + 1)-th layer. We know, for the j-th
node in the i-th layer, that its input is [Eq∗j , Eq
∗
j ]. Since we now assume that no nodes in the i-th layer are
overestimated nodes, we know that Relu(Eq∗j ) = Eq
∗
j or 0. Let yj denote its output and let y denote the vector
of outputs in this layer. Then, the output of the j-th node is [yj , yj ]. Considering the weights W , one can see
that the input for the k-th node of the (i + 1)-th layer is [Eqlow, Equp] = [(Wy)k, (Wy)k]. Thus, we have
Eqlow = Equp = Eq
∗ which is exactly the same as the claim.
corollary A.1. In a neural network that contains no overestimated node, there is no error in the output layer.
proof: This follows from Property A.2, as it tells us that, for each node, say node j, in the output layer,
Eqlow = Eq
∗ = Equp. Since this holds for all nodes, there is zero error.
A.2 Symbolic Linear Relaxation
lemma A.1. The maximum distances between the approximation given in symbolic linear relaxation as Equa-
tion 4 are −uuplup
uup−lup for upper bound and
−ulowllow
ulow−llow for lower bound.
Relu(Eqlow) 7→ ulow
ulow − llow (Eqlow) Relu(Equp) 7→
uup
uup − lup (Equp − lup) (4)
proof: The distance for upper bound in Equation 4 is:
dup =
uup
uup − lup (Equp − lup)−Relu(Equp)
=
{
uup
uup−lup (Equp − lup)− Equp (if 0 ≤ Equp ≤ uup)
uup
uup−lup (Equp − lup) (if lup ≤ Equp < 0)
≤ −uuplup
uup − lup (when Equp = 0)
(5)
The distance for lower bound in Equation 4 is:
dlow = Relu(Eqlow)− ulow
ulow − llow (Eqlow)
=
{
Eqlow − ulowulow−llow (Eqlow) (if 0 ≤ Eqlow ≤ ulow)
− ulow
ulow−llow (Eqlow) (if llow ≤ Eqlow < 0)
≤ − ulowllow
ulow − llow (when Eqlow = llow/Eqlow = ulow)
(6)
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property A.3. The approximation produced by symbolic linear relaxation Equp and Eqlow as Equation 4 has
the least maximum distance from the actual output Eq∗.
proof: We give the proof for upper and lower symbolic linear relaxation respectively.
(1) Upper symbolic linear relaxation: The maximum distance for upper bound in Equation 4 is m = −ul
u−l
when Eq(x) = 0 shown in Lemma A.1. If another symbolic linear relaxation that has maximum distance
m′ < m, then it can be written as Relu(Equp) 7→ k(Equp(x)) +m′ due to its linearity. To overestimate two
points Relu(u) 7→ k · u+m′ ≥ u and Relu(l) 7→ k · l ≥ 0, we arrive at the inequality u−m′
u
≤ k ≤ −m′
l
.
Consequently, we get m′ ≥ −ul
u−l , which conflicts with assumption m
′ < m.
(2) Lower symbolic linear relaxation: Also shown in Lemma A.1, the maximum distance m = −ul
u−l for
lower bound equation can be achieved when Eq = l or Eq = u. Assume there is another lower sym-
bolic linear relaxation has the maximum distance m′ < m, it can be similarly written as Relu(Eq(x)) 7→
u+m′1−m′2
u−l x −
ul+um′1−lm′2
u−l , where Relu(l) 7→ m′1 < m and Relu(u) 7→ m′2 < m. To ensure
Relu(0) 7→ −ul+um′1−lm′2
u−l ≤ 0, we see ul + um′1 − lm′2 ≥ 0, which conflicts with m′1 < m and m′2 < m.
Thus, we have shown the claim.
A.3 Directed Constraint Refinement
lemma A.2. If there are n overestimated nodes in a neural network, then after applying directed constraint
refinement to each of the n nodes, that is, considering 2n cases after splitting, we achieve a function F ′ satisfying
F ′ = F ∗, where F ∗ is the actual function.
proof: After splitting all the n overestimated nodes, for each split cases, all the nodes are constrained to be
linear and thus there is no overestimated node. According to Corollary A.1, we can see there is no error in the
output layer for each case. The output union F ′ of these 2n cases is an approximation of the network without
any overestimation error, which is exactly the same as the actual function F ∗.
B Detailed Study of Symbolic Linear Relaxation
As we have shown before in Section 3 of the paper, the insight of symbolic linear relaxation is in finding
the tightest possible linear bounds of the ReLU function and therefore minimizing the overestimation error
while approximating network outputs. Note that overestimated nodes in different layers will have different
approximation errors depending on the symbolic intervals that they were given as input. For layers before n0-th
layer, the one in which the first overestimated nodes occur, symbolic lower and upper bounds will be the same
for all nodes. This is shown in Property A.2, and makes the approximations in earlier layers a straightforward
computation. However, the expressions of lower and upper symbolic bounds can be much more complicated in
deeper layers where the presence of overestimated nodes becomes more frequent. To address this problem, we
discuss and illustrate how symbolic linear relaxation works in detail below.
We consider an arbitrary overestimated node A, with equation given by z = Relu(Eq), where its input Eq is
kept as a symbolic interval [Eqlow, Equp]. Furthermore, we let n0 denote the first layer in which overestimated
nodes occur, let nA denote the layer overestimated node A appears in, and let (llow, ulow) and (lup, uup) denote
the concrete lower and upper bound of A’s symbolic bounds Eqlow and Equp. We consider several cases for the
symbolic linear relaxations on A, depending on where it appears in relation to n0.
a. nA = n0 : If A is an overestimated node in n0, then, according to Property A.2, we see that A’s input
equation Eq satisfies Eqlow = Equp = Eq. Furthermore, due to Property A.1, u = maxx∈XEq(x) > 0 and
l = minx∈XEq(x) < 0, A′s output can be easily approximated by:
Relu([Eq,Eq]) 7→ [ u
u− lEq,
u
u− l (Eq − l)] (7)
b. nA > n0 : If A is an overestimated node after n0-th layer, possibly its symbolic lower bound equation Eqlow
is no longer the same as its upper bound equation Equp before relaxation. Though we can still approximate
the it as Relu([Eqlow, Equp]) 7→ [ uupuup−llowEqlow,
uup
uup−llow (Equp − llow)], this is not the tightest possible
bound. Therefore, we consider bounds on Eqlow and Equp independently to achieve tighter approximations.
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In details, this process can be divided into following four scenarios shown in Equation 8, each dependent on
different value taken by Eqlow and Equp.
Relu([Eqlow, Equp]) 7→
[0,
uup
uup−lup (Equp − lup)] (llow ≤ 0, lup ≤ 0, ulow ≤ 0, uup > 0)
[0, Equp] (llow ≤ 0, lup ≤ 0, ulow > 0, uup > 0)
[ ulow
ulow−llowEqlow,
uup
uup−lup (Equp − lup)] (llow ≤ 0, lup > 0, ulow ≤ 0, uup > 0)
[ ulow
ulow−llowEqlow, Equp] (llow ≤ 0, lup ≤ 0, ulow > 0, uup > 0)
(8)
For instance, consider an overestimated node satisfying the third case that both of Eqlow and Equp can take
concrete value spanning 0. The maximum error introduced by relaxation according to Equation 7 is −uupllow
uup−llow ,
while the relaxation by Equation 8 has smaller maximum error max(−uuplup
uup−lup ,
−ulowllow
ulow−llow ). Thus, we can see
such case work allows us to have tighter the approximations.
C Different Optimization and Implementation Details
In our initial experiments, we found out that the performance of matrix multiplications is a major determining
factor for the overall performance of the symbolic relaxation and interval propagation process. We use the highly
optimized OpenBLAS3 library for matrix multiplications. For solving the linear constraints generated during
the directed constraint refinement process, we use lp_solve 5.54. For formally checking non-existence of
adversarial images that can be generated by an L-2 norm bounded attacker, it requires us to solve an optimization
problem where the constraints are linear but the objective is quadratic. Since lp_solve does not support quadratic
objectives yet, Gurobi 8.0.05 solver can be further used to handle these attacks..
Parallelization. Our directed constraint refinement process is highly parallelizable as it creates an independent
set of linear programs that can be solved in parallel. For facilitating this process, Neurify creates a thread pool
where each thread solves one set of linear constraints with its own lp_solve instances. However, as the refinement
process might be highly uneven for different overestimated nodes, we periodically rebalance the queues of
different threads to minimize idle CPU time.
Outward Rounding. One of the side effects of floating point computations is that even minor precision drops on
one hidden node can be amplified significantly during propagations. To avoid such issues, we perform outward
rounding after every floating point computation, i.e., we always round [x, x] to [bxc, dxe]. Our current prototype
uses 32-bit float arithmetic that can support all of our current safety properties with outward rounding. If
needed, the analysis can be easily switched to 64-bit double.
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Figure 6: Element-wise matrix multiplications
to allow symbolic intervals to propagate through
convolutional kernels.
Supporting Convolutional Layers. Models with convo-
lutional layers are often used in computer vision appli-
cations. They usually perform matrix multiplications
with a convolution kernel as shown in the dash boxes
of Figure 6. To allow a symbolic interval to propa-
gate through various convolutional layers, we simply
multiply the symbolic interval inputs with the concrete
kernels as shown in Figure 6.
D Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of Neurify, we tested it with
9 different models, including fully connected ACAS Xu
models, three fully connected Drebin models, three fully connected MNIST models, one convolutional MNIST
model and one convolutional self-driving car model. The detailed structures of all these models are summarized
in Manuscript Table 1 and here we provide the detailed descriptions of each type of model.
ACAS Xu. ACAS is crucial aircraft alert systems used for alerting and preventing aircraft collisions. Its
unmanned system ACAS Xu [19] are networks advising decisions for aircraft based on the conditions of
intruders and ownships. Due to its powerful abilities, it is on schedule to be installed in over 30,000 passenger
and cargo aircraft worldwide [26] and US Navy’s fleets [1]. ACAS Xu is made up of 45 different models, each
3https://www.openblas.net/
4http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/5.5/
5http://www.gurobi.com/
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has five inputs, five outputs, six fully connected layers, fifty ReLU nodes in each layer. All the ACAS Xu models
and self-defined safety properties we tested are given in [17, 16, 39].
MNIST_FC. MNIST [21] is a handwritten digit dataset containing 28x28 pixel images with class labels from
0 to 9. The dataset includes 60,000 training samples and 10,000 testing samples. Here we use three different
architectures of fully connected MNIST models with accuracies of 96.59%, 97.43%, and 98.27%. The more
ReLU nodes the model has, the higher its accuracy is.
Drebin_FC. Drebin [5] is a dataset with 129,013 Android applications among which 123,453 are benign and
5,560 are malicious. Currently, there is a total of 784,544 binary features extracted from each application
according to 8 predefined categories [35]. The accuracy for Drebin_FC1, Drebin_FC2 and Drebin_FC3 are
97.61%, 98.53% and 99.01%. We show that compared to input bisection and refinement, directed constraint
refinement can be applied on more generalized networks, such as Drebin model with such large amount of input
features.
ConvNet. ConvNet is a comparably large convolutional MNIST models with about 5000 ReLU nodes used
in [42] trained on 60,000 MNIST dataset. Due to its large amounts of ReLU nodes, its safety property can never
be supported by the traditional solver-based formal analysis systems such as Reluplex [17].
Self-driving Car. Finally, we use a large-scale (with over 10,000 ReLU nodes) convolutional autonomous
vehicle model, on which no formal proof has been given before. The self-driving car dataset comes from
Udacity self-driving car challenge containing 101,396 training and 5,614 testing samples [4]. And we use similar
DAVE-2 self-driving car architecture from NVIDIA [6, 2] with 3× 100× 100 inputs and 1 regression output
for advisory direction. The detailed structure is shown in Manuscript Table 1. On such model, we have already
shown that Neurify can formally prove four different types of safety properties: L∞, L1, Brightness and contrast
on DAVE in Table 2.
E Additional Results
Neurify has either formally verified or provided counterexamples for thousands of safety properties, and we
summarize the additional primary properties Neurify can provide on different models in the first subsection in
details. Note that the results of DAVE can be found in Manuscript Section 4.
E.1 Cases verified by Neurify for Each Model
ConvNet. We evaluate Neurify on ConvNet, a large convolutional MNIST model. To the best of our knowledge,
none of traditional solver-based formal analysis systems can give formal guarantee for such large convolutional
MNIST network. However, Neurify is able to verify most of the properties within L∞ ≤ 5. We define the
safety property as whether the model will misclassify MNIST images within allowable input ranges bounded by
L∞ ≤ ( = 1, ..., 25). The results are shown in Table 7. The timeout setting here is 3600 seconds.
Table 7: Showing the percentage of images formally verified (safe and violated out of 100 randomly
selected images) by Neurify with different safety properties (L∞ ≤ ( = 1, ..., 25)) on MNIST
ConvNet.
 Safe(%) Violated(%) Total(%)
1 100 0 100
2 98 1 99
3 98 2 100
4 93 2 95
5 86 2 88
10 1 9 10
15 0 20 20
25 0 55 55
MNIST_FC. We also evaluate Neurify on three different fully connected MNIST models. The property
is defined as whether the image will be misclassified with allowable perturbed input ranges bounded by
L∞ ≤ ( = 1, ..., 15). In Table 8, we show the cases that Neurify can formally verify to be safe or find
concrete counterexamples on out of 100 random images from MNIST dataset within 3600 seconds.
15
Table 8: Total cases that can be verified by Neurify on three fully connected MNIST models out of
100 hand-written digits. The timeout setting here is 3600 seconds.
Models Cases(%) 1 2 5 10 15
MNIST_FC1
Violated 15 27 29 66 96
Safe 85 73 71 34 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
MNIST_FC2
Violated 0 11 26 74 83
Safe 100 89 68 9 5
Total 100 100 94 83 88
MNIST_FC3
Violated 0 4 8 6 23
Safe 96 87 79 33 27
Total 96 91 87 39 50
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Figure 7: The relationship between formal analysis time and the corresponding average and maximal
refinement depth for 37 ACAS Xu and 60 MNIST safety properties formally verified to be safe by
Neurify.
E.2 Benefits of Each Technique
We have described the benefits of our two main techniques, symbolic linear relaxation (SLR) and directed
constraint refinement (DCR) in Section 4 of the paper. Here, we describe additional experimental results for
illustrating the benefits of each technique used in Neurify.
Benefits of Depths in Refinement. The process of directed constraint refinement is a DFS search tree and each
iteration of refinement will generate two subtrees and thus increase one depth of whole DFS tree. We summarize
the formal analysis time on 37 ACAS Xu cases and 60 MNIST cases in terms of average and maximal depth
of the directed constraint refinement search tree in Figure 7. The results indicate that formal analysis time is
exponential to maximum and average depth. Therefore, in practice, we can leverage depths to estimate the whole
formal analysis progress.
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Figure 8: Neurify’s ability to locate concrete counterexamples compared to CW attacks with 5, 10,
20 random input seeds. We evaluate on MNIST_FC1, MNIST_FC2, MNIST_FC3, with 60 different
safety properties that have been verified to be violated by Neurify.
Benefits of Adversarial Searching Ability. We show that Neurify has stronger ability to find counterexamples
compared with current state-of-the-art gradient-based attack CW. Out of 60 violated cases found by Neurify on
MNIST_FC1, MNIST_FC2, MNIST_FC3, CW attacks can only locate 47%, 46% and 43% with 20, 10 and 5
random input seeds, shown in Figure 8.
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